On the Necessity of Rationalism

In the abut of considering the various means of justification, a relativistic concept of reality assumes that the justice and on that pointof the stiffness of a statement may only be assessed in relation to the perspective of the discipline which holds a particular belief. In this sense, truth is dependent upon the infixed coherence of beliefs within a strategy of thought. In his The stopping point Word, Nagel claims that much(prenominal) is not the case. He argues that the truth and hence the legitimateity of statements are dependent upon an unqualified notion of causation.He claims that the truth of a statement is independent upon all particular perspective. If such(prenominal) is the case, it follows that the truth of any statement is independent from the schema truth schema presented by any system of thought. In relation to scientific claims, it thereby follows that the truth of scientific claims ought to be assessed done the unqualified notion of mind as opposed to merely their internal coherence within the scientific conception of reality scientific framework.The aforesaid(prenominal) aim is found upon the critique of the intrinsic limits to subjectivist doubt since challenges to the independent validity of reason must themselves assume the independent validity of reason. Any explanation of reason deriving from outside the mind can itself be explained only from deep down the mind, as having its own independent validity. In the case of scientific fellowship, he argues that it is mistaken to assume that the scientific discipline has freed itself from the limits of the Cartesian problem by the replacement of judgments about rules of practice from objective judgments.Nagel argues that if science will continually adhere to a subjectivistic and hence relativistic framework, the discipline will wander to provide an objective study of reality. He claims, the general aim of such reasoning scientific reasoning is to make sense of the world in which we find ourselves and how it appears to us and some others (81). If such is the case, it is necessary to conceive of the conception of the world which is not based upon an a priori conception of reality dependent upon a preconceived and particular conception of the word. According to Nagel, such an account is not provided by science.The reasons for this lies in the subjectivism of science (Nagel 84). Subjectivism within science scientific methods is apparent if one considers that the scientific supplicate for order cannot itself be keenly justified nor does it correspond to a taken for granted(predicate) demand (Nagel 84). He notes that scientific subjectivism can only end if it adheres to rational means of noesis acquisition. It is only through the defense of rationalism that an objectivist account of evidence is possible.Nagel further argues that the appeal of subjectivism arises out of a certain reductionist craving in modern explanation as this reductionist impuls e enables the explanation of things to hinge on their reduction to local and finite ground thereby ensuring subjectivist conclusions. Although this enables the assurance against rationalist explanations that refuse to make reason into something chimerical or that conceive of reason as a capacity for devouring(a) the universal and infinite principle, the reductionist explanation is in itself dependent on an irreducibly nonlocal and objective understanding of reason. Nagel argues that doubt about reason presupposes reasons independent validity hence reasons independent validity cannot be coherently doubted.He rightly argues that to object to reason on the cubic yard we cannot strictly explain it in naturalistic terms is to misunderstand the irreducible nature of the concept since reason cannot be so explained without losing its meaning or validity and that, as such, it is justified in a different way, by showing it to be necessary to intelligible thought and action. Science thereb y must opt for a rationalistic as opposed to a subjectivistic account of reality for it to maintain its value as a discipline.Work CitedNagel, Thomas. The Last Word. New York Oxford University Press, 1997.Essay Number TwoEdmund Gettiers Counterargument Against thePlatonic Tripartite Account of Propositional KnowledgeThe Platonic many-sided definition of propositional and fallibilist association found in the last section of the Theaetetus states that association of P occurs when an epistemic agent S knows that P if and only if (1) P is true, (2) S trusts that P, and (3) S is justified in believing that P (90). A well-known opposition to such an account of propositional knowledge questions the sufficiency of the aforementioned checks.It is argued that although the aforementioned conditions are necessary in the definition of propositional knowledge such conditions are insufficient due to their failure to ensure S against conditions wherein knowledge of P occurs as a result of mere epistemic part (Gettier 123). This critique is best known as the Gettier typesetters case reply examples towards the three-way definition of propositional knowledge mentioned above.A logical problem is posited by the Gettier type counter examples. This logical problem is evident in the lack of successful coordination mingled with the truth of P and the reasons that justify S in holding P. Floridi notes that Gettier type counter examples arise because the truth and the justification of P happen to be not only independent but also opaquely unrelated that they happen to fail to converge or agree on the homogeneous propositional content Pwithout S realizing it (64). In order to understand this, it is big to lay down the main presumptions of Gettiers counter argument that seeks to contrive the aforementioned logical problem.Gettiers argument against the multilateral account of propositional knowledge, which pertains the conception of knowledge as justified true belief arose a s a result of the next claim knowledge propositional knowledge does not merely involve justified true belief. Such a claim is based upon the following assumptions. First, there are instances wherein the authority is not a sufficient condition for a belief in P. This is evident if one considers that instances of belief and knowledge of P are in some respects epistemically different other than in terms of truth from belief of P without knowledge of P. Second, there are instances wherein warrant is fallible.This is due to the insufficiency of truth and justification as warrants for knowledge. The evidence of such, consort to Gettier is apparent if one considers that it is possible for P to be false crimson if S believes that P possesses epistemically significant properties such that whenever a belief possesses such properties and is true the belief may thereby qualify as knowledge. Lastly, there is the closure of knowledge under obvious and known entailments. The last assumption ar gues that if S is justified in believing P and a deductively valid inference is drawn from P to another belief Q then S is justified in believing Q. This is a result of the entailment of Q from P.From what was tell above, it is possible to present the usual form of Gettiers attack against the tripartite account of knowledge. Gettiers counter argument is based upon the critique of warrant, fallibility, and closure. card that combination of the three claims mentioned above leads to a contradiction. From what was mentioned above it follows that it is possible to believe in an obvious deductive consequence of P, which is Q, while in the work on retaining the epistemically significant properties of the belief in P.If such is the case, it is possible to have a justified true belief of any property which has led S to have a belief in Q or any other type of belief which has Qs epistemic characteristics. Note that this contradicts the assumed necessity that P and Q differ from each other since one qualifies as knowledge S believes and has knowledge of P whereas Q merely qualifies as a belief S believes but does not have knowledge of Q.Works CitedFloridi, L. On the Logical Unsolvability of the Gettier Problem. Synthese 142(2004) 61-79.Gettier, E. Is Justified True public opinion Knowledge? Analysis 23(1963) 121-23.Plato. Theaetetus. Trans. M.J. Levett. Indiana Hackett Publishing Co., 1992.